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Studies on developmental dyscalculia (DD) have tried to identify a basic numerical deﬁcit
that could account for this speciﬁc learning disability. The ﬁrst proposition was that the
number magnitude representation of these children was impaired. However, Rousselle
and Noël (2007) brought data showing that this was not the case but rather that these
children were impaired when processing the magnitude of symbolic numbers only. Since
then, incongruent results have been published. In this paper, we will propose a develop-
mental perspective on this issue. We will argue that the ﬁrst deﬁcit shown in DD regards
the building of an exact representation of numerical value, thanks to the learning of sym-
bolic numbers, and that the reduced acuity of the approximate number magnitude system
appears only later and is secondary to the ﬁrst deﬁcit.
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Developmental dyscalculia (DD) is a persistent and speciﬁc dis-
order of the numerical development and mathematical learning.
In the recent years, several authors have proposed that DD arises
from a fundamental impairment in the representation of number
magnitudes (e.g., Butterworth, 1999, 2005; Wilson and Dehaene,
2007). In this paper,wewill argue that the ﬁrst deﬁcit shown inDD
does not support the hypothesis of an impairment at that level.
Rather, we will argue that the ﬁrst deﬁcits of DD regards the con-
struction of an exact representation of numerical value, that builds
on the acquisition of symbolic number meaning1. The reduced
acuity of the approximate number magnitude system would only
appear later and would be secondary to the ﬁrst deﬁcit.
According to what we will call the simple story, babies are born
with an innate analog magnitude system speciﬁcally tuned to
numerical information (Xu and Spelke, 2000; Lipton and Spelke,
2003, 2004; Xu, 2003; Feigenson et al., 2004; Xu et al., 2005). This
system yields approximate, noisy representations and is thus called
the approximate number system or ANS. Throughout the develop-
ment, the acuity of that system increases (Halberda and Feigenson,
2008). When the child learns the number words in the counting
routine, these symbols take their meaning from the connections
they establishwith thisANS (Dehaene, 1992;Gallistel andGelman,
1992; Dehaene and Cohen, 1995, 1997). Finally, this ANS would
also be crucial for more advanced numerical learning as individual
differences in the acuity of that representation correlatewithmath-
ematics achievement (Halberda et al., 2008). Accordingly, some
1In this paper, the terms “symbolic numbers”must be understood as every symbols
that bear a precise cardinal meaning and that are part of an ordered sequence. In
typical development, the ﬁrst symbols referring to a precise numerosity are cer-
tainly verbal number words but in other culture, it could be body part counting for
example.
researchers have argued that DD could result from a core dys-
function of that representation (Butterworth, 1999, 2005; Landerl
et al., 2004; Wilson and Dehaene, 2007). Indeed, several authors
found that, when comparing sets of dots, DD children showed
less sensitivity to numerical differences than control children, thus
showing a reduced number acuity (Piazza et al., 2010; Mazzocco
et al., 2011). Similarly, Mussolin et al. (2010) observed that DD
children were slower and less accurate than control children when
comparing small and close numerosities. Finally, using a free esti-
mation production task with completely non-symbolic input and
output, Mejias et al. (in press) observed that the estimates pro-
duced by DD children were less precise and more variable that
those of typically achieving children (see also Mazzocco et al.,
2011 for similar observations). All these data thus support the
hypothesis of a deﬁcient ANS in DDs.
However, a number of researches brought data that are incon-
sistent with this view. First, in unselected populations, perfor-
mance in the comparison of two sets of dots failed to account
for individual difference in mathematics (Holloway and Ansari,
2009; Mundy and Gilmore, 2009). Second, when comparing the
magnitude of two sets of dots, a series of studies (Rousselle and
Noël, 2007; Iuculano et al., 2008; Landerl and Kölle, 2009; De
Smedt and Gilmore, 2011) failed to ﬁnd any difference between
the performance of DD and control children. However, in all these
studies, DD children displayed signiﬁcant impairment in Arabic
number comparison and calculation. Accordingly, Rousselle and
Noël (2007) proposed that the central deﬁcit inDDchildrenwould
not be a defect of the ANS itself but rather in accessing the numer-
ical magnitude information conveyed by symbols such as Arabic
numbers or number words.
How can we account for this contradictory pattern of results?
We could ﬁrst consider the type of measure used. For instance,
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Piazza et al. (2010) and Mazzocco et al. (2011) measured the acu-
ity of the ANS by calculating the index w. Such a method was
not used by the other authors. However, among those who mea-
sured a distance effect, another indicator of the precision of the
ANS, some found signiﬁcant difference between DD and control
children (e.g., Price et al., 2007; Mussolin et al., 2010) and some
did not (e.g., Landerl and Kölle, 2009; De Smedt and Gilmore,
2011). If we list all the studies that have compared DD and con-
trol children’s ability to process the magnitude of non-symbolic
(i.e., dot collections) or symbolic numbers (Arabic digits or num-
ber words) and order them according to the age of the children
tested (see Table 1), a clear picture emerges. First, at all ages, DD
children perform signiﬁcantly lower than controls in the magni-
tude comparison tasks using symbolic numbers. Second, for tasks
using non-symbolic numbers, a dissociation appears between the
studies which tested younger (6–9 years old) versus older children
(10 years old and above): only the latter showed some signiﬁcant
difference2. Thus, the ﬁrst deﬁcit seen in DD children is speciﬁc to
the magnitude processing of symbolic numbers. Dyscalculia chil-
dren’s deﬁcit in processing non-symbolic number magnitude only
appears later, on a second time.
Given the changing proﬁle of DD according to their age, a
developmental perspective must be adopted. However, consider-
ing this picture, it should be acknowledged that the simple story
can not easily explain why DD children would have a ﬁrst difﬁculty
with number symbols and only later with the ANS, especially if we
consider than the meaning of number symbols is learned through
the mapping with the ANS. At this point, it is thus necessary to
consider other theoretical perspectives.
More and more recent developmental data support the idea
that the meaning of number words is not gained through the sim-
ple mapping between these number words and the ANS. First, if
the child simply has to map number symbols to the ANS, why
would it take so long before he/she understands the meaning of
2Let us however note a difference in the proﬁles obtained by Landerl et al. (2009)
and by Landerl and Kölle (2009). Although they used the same tasks and the same
age range for participants, only the ﬁrst one showed slower RTs in the non-symbolic
magnitude comparison task. The only difference between the studies is that the
cutoff criteria to deﬁne MLD is 1 SD below the mean in the ﬁrst one and 1.5 SD
below the mean in the second one.
Table 1 | Comparison of the performance of DD and Control children in
the symbolic or non-symbolic number comparison.
References Age
(years old)
Symbolic Non-
symbolic
De Smedt and Gilmore (2011) 6 DD<C DD=C
Rousselle and Noël (2007) 7 DD<C DD=C
Landerl et al. (2004) 8–9 DD<C –
Iuculano et al. (2008) 8–9 DD<C DD=C
Landerl and Kölle (2009) 8–9–10 DD<C DD=C
Landerl et al. (2009) 8–9–10 DD<C DD<C
Piazza et al. (2010) 10 – DD<C
Mussolin et al. (2010) 10–11 DD<C DD<C
Price et al. (2007) 12 – DD<C
Mazzocco et al. (2011) 14 – DD<C
the number words? At least a year elapses between the time a child
is able to recite the counting sequence and the moment he/she
comes to understand the cardinal value of the verbal numerals
in the sequence (as demonstrated by succeeding at tasks such as
“What is on this card?”or“Giveme n items”;Wynn, 1992). Second,
young children who do not yet understand the precise meaning
of the number words in their counting sequence do not show the
typical characteristics of ANS when required to estimate the num-
ber of items in a set (Lipton and Spelke, 2005; Le Corre and Carey,
2007).
For these reasons, another set of theories has been put forward
which argue that the learning of symbolic numbers would lead to
the emergence of a newnumerical representation system inhuman
ontogeny (see Carey, 2001, 2004; Wiese, 2003b, 2007; Noël et al.,
2008). Endowed with a semantic content based on the ordinal
information enclosed in the symbol sequence, this new represen-
tation would allow representing exact numerical value, contrary to
the ANS which is only an approximate representation of number
magnitude.
Carey’s (2001, 2004, 2009) developmentalmodel perfectly illus-
trates this standpoint. She proposes that representations of natural
numbers are ﬁrst built on a “parallel individuation” system allow-
ing babies to keep track of the items in a small set through mental
models which encode their spatio-temporal properties (Kahne-
man et al., 1992; Trick and Pylyshyn, 1994; Simon, 1997). Indeed,
contrarily to the ANS, the parallel individuation system provides
an exact, although implicit, representation of small numerosities
and, by creating a mental model for each new element, provides
a natural representation of the operation of “adding one” to an
array. The capacity to represent ordered relations, and the sensi-
tivity to syntactico-semantic markers of quantiﬁcation present in
language, could also play a signiﬁcant role in this developmental
step (see also Wiese, 2003a,b; Sarnecka et al., 2007). All these tools
would help children gradually learn the meaning of the number
words one, then a few months later two, then again a few months
later three, and then four. As this parallel individuation system is
very limited and only allows the child to track 3 or 4 items in par-
allel, another processing is required for the next developmental
step.
At this point, the child has to discover that the cardinal value of
a number word is determined by its order on the list, and that suc-
cessive numbers are related by the function “+1”: For any known
number n in the list, the value of the next number is n + 1. This
successor function is probably worked out by induction on the
basis of the child’s knowledge of the cardinal meaning of one, two,
three, and four. Sarnecka and Carey (2008) have shown that this
conceptual jump is, at least, a two-stage process. First, children
understand that adding one item to a set leads to a cardinal which
is labeled by a word further away in the counting list than the
word denoting the initial cardinal. Second, children understand
that adding one item to a set leads to a cardinal labeled by the
word just after the one used to tag the initial cardinal. At this
point, children master the successor function and have discovered
how verbal numerals represent the natural numbers.
In Carey’s view, it is only after children have created this new
representation of exact numbers that they start to map it with
the ANS (see Le Corre and Carey, 2007) and thus establish con-
nections between the old, approximate representation of number
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FIGURE 1 | A two semantic number representation model with an
approximate representation for non-symbolic numbers and an exact
representation for symbolic numbers.
magnitude and the new, exact representation of natural numbers
(see Figure 1).
This distinction between an approximate and an exact repre-
sentation is also consistent with cross-cultural evidence showing
that adults leaving in cultures with very limited number lexicon
and no counting system are unable to develop an exact representa-
tion of numbers beyond 3 or 4, although their ANS is quite normal
(Gordon, 2004; Pica et al., 2004). Similarly, deaf adults leaving in
numerate communities who have developed their own signs for
numbers but not embedded in a counting system do not develop
representations of large exact numerosities (Spaepen et al., 2011).
In summary, although we share an ANS with animals, it is only if
we have the chance to learn a number system based on the suc-
cessor function and embedded in a counting process that we can
develop an exact representation of large numberswhich is the basis
of exact mathematics.
How can this developmental perspective shed light on the data
of DD? As we saw, the ﬁrst difﬁculties seen in DD children con-
cern the processing of symbolic number magnitude. Accordingly,
we propose that the ﬁrst difﬁculty of DD children is to develop
an exact representation of natural numbers. As for the ﬁrst num-
bers, this representation is assumed to build on the parallel indi-
viduation system, DD children’s difﬁculty to elaborate an exact
numerical representation could originate from the limitation of
this parallel tracking system, as manifested by the reduction of the
subitizing range in children with DD (see Koontz and Berch, 1996;
Schleifer and Landerl, 2011). But this initial limitation is proba-
bly not the only difﬁculty they would encounter in constructing
an exact numerical representation. Later, the induction process
needed to discover the successor function might also be impaired
in DD children.
In Carey’s (2004, 2009) model, once the child has developed an
exact representation of natural numbers, he/she starts to connect
it with the ANS. Because the representation of natural numbers
is precise, some authors have assumed that its mapping onto the
ANS would increase the precision of that intrinsically approx-
imate system (see Halberda et al., 2008; Piazza et al., 2010).
Indeed, change in number acuity are seen throughout the child’s
development (going from a w = 0.525 at age 3 to a w = 0.179
at age 6) up to adulthood (w = 0.108, Halberda and Feigenson,
2008). Of course, these changes might be due to natural brain
maturation but concurrently, they might be stimulated by the
manipulation, processing, and calculation of exact numbers. In
the same way as color names in language deﬁnes category bound-
aries which inﬂuence color perception (Regier and Kay, 2009), the
existence of number words referring to exact numerosities could
in turn shape the perceived boundaries between numerosities
at the non-symbolic level. In fact, the same kind of recipro-
cal inﬂuence has long been recognized in reading development:
phonological abilities facilitate the development of reading but
reading in turn improves phonological sensitivity as well (Per-
fetti et al., 1987; Bentin and Leshem, 1993; Burgess and Lonigan,
1998).
Such a hypothesis could explain why an initial difﬁculty with
symbolic numbers and the manipulation of exact number pro-
cessing would prevent DD children from reﬁning their ANS in
the same way as typically developing children do. This inefﬁcient
reﬁnement would predict a slower growth of number acuity in
DD children. This delayed maturation of number acuity would
lead to increasing difference in number acuity between DD and
control children over development. Thus, while only small and
non-signiﬁcant differences between DD and control children are
measured in tasks tapping the precision of the ANS in young
populations, larger and signiﬁcant differences are reported in
populations of older children.
To sum up, the simple story fails to give a plausible account for
the developmental trajectory of the basic deﬁcits actually reported
inDDchildren.Herewe argue that developmental theories assum-
ing the construction of an exact representation of symbolic num-
bers (based on the ordinal properties of numbers in the counting
sequence) offer a more powerful explanation for the pattern of
results actually depicted in the literature. Considering the devel-
opmental course of DD children’s impairments, we hypothesize
that their ﬁrst deﬁcit, manifested in symbolic number processing
tasks,would result from a basic dysfunction in the building process
of this exact representation of symbolic numbers. Appearing later,
the reduced acuity of the ANS would be the consequence, rather
than the cause, of this ﬁrst deﬁcit.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The two authors of this paper are supported by the National
Research Fund of Belgium.
REFERENCES
Bentin, S., and Leshem, H. (1993).
On the interaction between
phonological awareness and
reading acquisition: it’s a two-
way street. Ann. Dyslexia 43,
125–148.
Burgess, S. R., and Lonigan, C. J. (1998).
Bidirectional relations of phono-
logical sensitivity and prereading
abilities: evidence from a preschool
sample. J. Exp. Child. Psychol. 70,
117–141.
Butterworth, B. (1999). The Mathemat-
ical Brain. London: Macmillan.
Butterworth, B. (2005). “Developmen-
tal dyscalculia,” in Handbook of
Mathematical Cognition, ed. J. I. D.
Campbell (New York: Psychology
Press), 298–318.
Carey, S. (2001). Cognitive foun-
dations of arithmetic: evolution
and ontogenesis. Mind Lang. 16,
37–55.
Carey, S. (2004). Bootstrapping and the
origin of concepts. Daedalus 133,
59–68.
Carey, S. (2009). The Origin of Concepts
(Oxford series in cognitive develop-
ment). New York: Oxford University
Press.
De Smedt, B., and Gilmore, C. K.
(2011). Defective number module
or impaired access? Numerical
magnitude processing in ﬁrst
graders with mathematical difﬁ-
culties. J. Exp. Child. Psychol. 108,
278–292.
Dehaene, S. (1992). Varieties of numer-
ical abilities. Cognition 44, 1–42.
Dehaene, S., and Cohen, L. (1995).
Towards an anatomical and func-
tional model of number processing.
Math. Cogn. 1, 83–120.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 165 | 3
Noël and Rousselle Developmental changes in dyscalculia
Dehaene, S., and Cohen, L. (1997).
Cerebral pathways for calculation:
double dissociation between rote
verbal and quantities knowledge of
arithmetic. Cortex 33, 219–250.
Feigenson, L., Dehaene, S., and Spelke,
E. (2004). Core systems of num-
ber. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 8,
307–314.
Gallistel, C. R., and Gelman, R. (1992).
Preverbal and verbal counting and
computation. Cognition 44, 43–74.
Gordon, P. (2004). Numerical cogni-
tion without words: evidence from
Amazonia. Science 306, 496–499.
Halberda, J., and Feigenson, L. (2008).
Developmental change in the acuity
of the “number sense”: the approxi-
mate number system in 3-,4-,5-, and
6-year-olds and adults. Dev. Psychol.
44, 1457–1465.
Halberda, J., Mazzocco, M. M. M., and
Feigenson, L. (2008). Individual dif-
ferences in non-verbal number acu-
ity correlate with maths achieve-
ment. Nature 455, 665–668.
Holloway, I. D., and Ansari, D.
(2009). Mapping numerical magni-
tudes onto symbols: the numerical
distance effect and individual dif-
ferences in children’s mathematics
achievement. J. Exp. Child. Psychol.
103, 17–29.
Iuculano, T., Tang, J., Hall, C. W. B.,
and Butterworth, B. (2008). Core
information processing deﬁcits in
developmental dyscalculia and low
numeracy. Dev. Sci. 11, 669–680.
Kahneman,D., Treisman,A., and Gibbs,
B. J. (1992). The reviewing of par-
allel individuations: object speciﬁc
integration of information. Cogn.
Psychol. 24, 174–219.
Koontz, K. L., and Berch, D. B.
(1996). Identifying simple numer-
ical stimuli: processing inefﬁcien-
cies exhibited by arithmetic learn-
ing disabled children. Math. Cogn. 2,
1–23.
Landerl, K., Bevan,A., and Butterworth,
B. (2004). Developmental dyscalcu-
lia and basic numerical capacities:
a study of 8-9-year-old students.
Cognition 93, 99–125.
Landerl, K., Fussenegger, B., Moll, K.,
and Willburger, E. (2009). Dyslexia
and dyscalculia: two learning disor-
ders with different cognitive proﬁles.
J. Exp. Child. Psychol. 103, 309–324.
Landerl, K., and Kölle, C. (2009). Typ-
ical and atypical development of
basic numerical skills in elementary
school. J. Exp. Child. Psychol. 103,
546–565.
Le Corre, M., and Carey, S. (2007).
One, two, three, four, nothing more:
an investigation of the conceptual
sources of the verbal counting prin-
ciples. Cognition 105, 395–438.
Lipton, J. S., and Spelke, E. S. (2003).
Origins of the number sense: large-
number discrimination in human
infants. Psychol. Sci. 14, 396–401.
Lipton, J. S., and Spelke, E. S. (2004).
Discrimination of large and small
numerosities by human infants.
Infancy 5, 271–290.
Lipton, J. S., and Spelke, E. S.
(2005). Preschool children’s map-
ping of number words to non-
symbolic numerosities. Child Dev.
76, 978–988.
Mazzocco, M. M., Feigenson, L., and
Halberda, J. (2011). Impaired acuity
of the approximate number system
underliesmathematical learningdis-
ability (dyscalculia). Child Dev. 82,
1224–1237.
Mejias, S., Mussolin, C., and Rous-
selle, L., Grégoire, J., and Noël,
M.-P. (in press). Numerical and
non-numerical estimation in chil-
dren with and without mathemati-
cal learning disabilities.ChildNeuro-
psychol. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
09297049.2011.625355
Mundy, E., and Gilmore, C. K. (2009).
Children’s mapping between sym-
bolic and non-symbolic representa-
tion of number. J. Exp. Child. Psy-
chol. 103, 490–502.
Mussolin, C., Mejias, S., and Noël,
M.-P. (2010). Symbolic and non-
symbolic number comparison in
children with and without dyscalcu-
lia. Cognition 115, 10–25.
Noël, M.-P., Grégoire, J., Meert, G., and
Seron, X. (2008). The innate schema
of natural numbers does not explain
historical, cultural, and develop-
mental differences. Behav. Brain Sci.
31, 6, 664–665.
Perfetti, C. A., Beck, I., Bell, L.,
and Hughes, C. (1987). Phonemic
knowledge and learning to read are
reciprocal: a longitudinal study of
ﬁrst grade children. Merrill Palmer
Q. 33, 283–319.
Piazza, M., Facoetti, A., Trussardi, A. N.,
Berteletti, I., Conte, S., Lucangeli, D.,
Dehaene, S., and Zorzi, M. (2010).
Developmental trajectory of num-
ber acuity reveals a severe impair-
ment in developmental dyscalculia.
Cognition 116, 33–41.
Pica, P., Lemer, C., Izard, V., and
Dehaene, S. (2004). Exact and
approximate arithmetic in an Ama-
zonian indigene group. Science 306,
499–503.
Price, G. R., Holloway, I., Rasanen,
P., Vesterinen, M., and Ansari, D.
(2007). Impaired parietalmagnitude
processing in developmental dyscal-
culia. Curr. Biol. 17, R1042–R1043.
Regier, T., and Kay, P. (2009). Language,
thought, and color: Whorf was half
right. Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.)
13, 439–446.
Rousselle, L., and Noël, M.-P. (2007).
Basic numerical skills in children
with mathematics learning disabil-
ities: a comparison of symbolic
versus non-symbolic number mag-
nitude processing. Cognition 102,
361–395.
Sarnecka, B. W., and Carey, S. (2008).
How counting represents num-
ber: what children must learn and
when they learn it. Cognition 108,
662–674.
Sarnecka, B. W., Kamenskaya, V. G.,
Yamana, Y., Ogura, T., and Yudov-
ina, Y. B. (2007). From grammati-
cal number to exact numbers: early
meanings of ‘one’, ‘two’, and ‘three’ in
English,Russian and Japanese. Cogn.
Psychol. 55, 136–168.
Schleifer, P., and Landerl, K. (2011).
Subitizing and counting in typical
and atypical development. Dev. Sci.
14, 280–291.
Simon, T. J. (1997). Reconceptualizing
the origins of number knowledge:
a “non-numerical” account. Cogn.
Dev. 12, 349–372.
Spaepen, E., Coppola, M., Spelke, E. S.,
Carey, S. E., and Goldin-Meadow, S.
(2011). Number without a language
model. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
108, 3163–3168.
Trick, L. M., and Pylyshyn, Z. W.
(1994). Why are small and large
numbers enumerated differently?
A limited-capacity preattentive
stage in vision. Psychol. Rev. 101,
80–102.
Wiese, H. (2003a). Iconic and non-
iconic stages in number develop-
ment: the role of language. Trends
Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 7, 385–390.
Wiese, H. (2003b). Numbers, Language
and the Human Mind. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Wiese, H. (2007). The co-evolution
of number concepts and counting
words. Lingua 117, 758–772.
Wilson, A. J., and Dehaene, S. (2007).
“Number sense and developmen-
tal dyscalculia,” in Human Behavior,
Learning, and the Developing Brain:
Atypical Development, 2nd Edn, eds
D. Coch, G. Dawson, and K. Fis-
cher (New York: Guilford Press),
212–237.
Wynn, K. (1992). Children’s acquisi-
tion of the number words and the
counting system. Cogn. Psychol. 24,
220–251.
Xu, F. (2003). Numerosity discrimina-
tion in infants: evidence for two sys-
tems of representations. Cognition
89, B15–B25.
Xu, F., and Spelke, E. S. (2000).
Large number discrimination in 6-
month-old infants. Cognition 74,
B1–B11.
Xu, F., and Spelke, E. S., and Goddard,
S. (2005). Number sense in human
infants. Dev. Sci. 8, 88–101.
Conﬂict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any
commercial or ﬁnancial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conﬂict of interest.
Received: 23 August 2011; accepted: 27
November 2011; published online: 21
December 2011.
Citation: Noël M-P and Rousselle
L (2011) Developmental changes in
the proﬁles of dyscalculia: an expla-
nation based on a double exact-
and-approximate number representation
model. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 5:165. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2011.00165
Copyright © 2011 Noël and Rousselle.
This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution Non Commercial License,
which permits non-commercial use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in other
forums, provided the original authors and
source are credited.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 165 | 4
